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© 2018 John D. Brey.
Ritual circumcision is the symbol of a referent (a reality)
it isn't in and of itself. A Jew is still a Jew even if the sign isn't cut in
the flesh. In fact, Genesis 17 makes it clear that they're two different
things: the reality (referent) and the sign of that reality (the cut).
Here's the kicker. Same with having a Jewish mother. It, a "Jewish mother," is the sign of a referent (a reality) it isn't in and of itself. A "Jewish mother" is symbolic of something real that is real even if the symbol, "Jewish mother," isn't there. A person can be just as much a Jew without a "Jewish mother" as they can be a Jew without the mark of circumcision. Both are emblems, symbols, tokens, of a reality neither of them are in actuality.
Here's the kicker. Same with having a Jewish mother. It, a "Jewish mother," is the sign of a referent (a reality) it isn't in and of itself. A "Jewish mother" is symbolic of something real that is real even if the symbol, "Jewish mother," isn't there. A person can be just as much a Jew without a "Jewish mother" as they can be a Jew without the mark of circumcision. Both are emblems, symbols, tokens, of a reality neither of them are in actuality.
The question then, is, what identity can pass through a
mother's womb without the father having a say so or similar right of transfer?
In jus sanguinis, nationality is considered a right of blood (thought
it's nothing of the sort). It passes through the parents to the child. But
nationality isn't really genetic or a property of blood. So jus sanguinis
as a blood rite, a right of blood, is only symbolic, even as nationality is
symbolic. A person doesn't really have a blood or genetic relationship to the
geographical location of their parents.
Col. Thieme used to refer to the theological distinction between a "judicial" imputation, versus a "real" imputation. A real imputation is something that passed through the genes or the blood, hair color, gender, height, etc.. A real imputation really passes through the biology of a mother's womb. A judicial imputation, on the other hand, is something that’s passed through laws, like nationality, legal identity, and such not. It doesn't really pass through the womb (if it did there would be a scientific test that could pick it up in the lab). It’s a legal construct only symbolically treated as though it were part of the accouterments acquired through the biology and nature of the womb.
Jewish identity is a judicial imputation and not a real imputation (there's no scientific test that can pick up Jewish identity in the blood). It’s a legal construct and not a biological construct. Jewish identity isn't genetic or biological, it’s judicial. In this sense it's parallel to jus sanguinis, a construct "legally" associated with "blood" or "biology" (the womb) when in truth it’s nothing of the sort. Nationality doesn't pass through the biology of the womb. It passes through the dictates (so to say) of the law. Jewish identity doesn't pass through the womb, the blood. It passes through the dictates of the law.
Which is where the quintessential question arises? Since, in jus sanguinis, a child can legally acquire their nationality from either parent, why can a Jew acquire their Jewish identity, which is only a legal construct, only from the mother? What’s the nature of Jewish identity such that only the mother can transfer it legally to the child? Why can't the father transfer Jewish identity? Why does the law only recognize a Jewish mother as being capable of transferring Jewish identity when it's merely a legal construct, not a genetic, or blood property?
This is not to question the legitimacy of the law of Jewish identity. It's no doubt correct. But what does it mean?
Col. Thieme used to refer to the theological distinction between a "judicial" imputation, versus a "real" imputation. A real imputation is something that passed through the genes or the blood, hair color, gender, height, etc.. A real imputation really passes through the biology of a mother's womb. A judicial imputation, on the other hand, is something that’s passed through laws, like nationality, legal identity, and such not. It doesn't really pass through the womb (if it did there would be a scientific test that could pick it up in the lab). It’s a legal construct only symbolically treated as though it were part of the accouterments acquired through the biology and nature of the womb.
Jewish identity is a judicial imputation and not a real imputation (there's no scientific test that can pick up Jewish identity in the blood). It’s a legal construct and not a biological construct. Jewish identity isn't genetic or biological, it’s judicial. In this sense it's parallel to jus sanguinis, a construct "legally" associated with "blood" or "biology" (the womb) when in truth it’s nothing of the sort. Nationality doesn't pass through the biology of the womb. It passes through the dictates (so to say) of the law. Jewish identity doesn't pass through the womb, the blood. It passes through the dictates of the law.
Which is where the quintessential question arises? Since, in jus sanguinis, a child can legally acquire their nationality from either parent, why can a Jew acquire their Jewish identity, which is only a legal construct, only from the mother? What’s the nature of Jewish identity such that only the mother can transfer it legally to the child? Why can't the father transfer Jewish identity? Why does the law only recognize a Jewish mother as being capable of transferring Jewish identity when it's merely a legal construct, not a genetic, or blood property?
This is not to question the legitimacy of the law of Jewish identity. It's no doubt correct. But what does it mean?
It's not that difficult to think of brit milah as the
symbol of a referent visually manifest through the symbolism inherent in the
ritual. After all, ritual circumcision is called a "sign," which in
Hebrew parlance is just that, a visual representation of an actual referent
manifest in the nature of the sign. . . But the suggestion that matrilineal
transfer of identity is a "sign" would be almost impossible to get
ones head around if it wasn't the perfect compliment to the very sign of the
covenant: brit milah.
Together, brit milah, and matrilineal transfer of identity, are a match made in heaven, since if the male-organ is bled as the sign of the covenant (and blood outside a body always represents death in Hebrew symbolism) then the death of the male-organ almost requires matrilineal transfer of identity. -----A natural adjunct to this symbolism is the concept that a new soul descends when the Jew is reborn on the eighth day. According to Rabbi Hirsch, this new soul is the product of a new birth, the Jew is born-again on the eighth day (so he requires a new soul to go along with the new birth). Not only does Rabbi Yitzchak Ginsburgh concur with Rabbi Hirsch, but he adds an addendum that supports the primary idea being posited about matrilineal transfer of identity:
Together, brit milah, and matrilineal transfer of identity, are a match made in heaven, since if the male-organ is bled as the sign of the covenant (and blood outside a body always represents death in Hebrew symbolism) then the death of the male-organ almost requires matrilineal transfer of identity. -----A natural adjunct to this symbolism is the concept that a new soul descends when the Jew is reborn on the eighth day. According to Rabbi Hirsch, this new soul is the product of a new birth, the Jew is born-again on the eighth day (so he requires a new soul to go along with the new birth). Not only does Rabbi Yitzchak Ginsburgh concur with Rabbi Hirsch, but he adds an addendum that supports the primary idea being posited about matrilineal transfer of identity:
The intent of drawing down a holy soul is associated as well with the ancient rite of anointing the kings of Israel. The effect of this ritual was to draw the kingly soul of the king-to-be into his consciousness; prior to this he was completely incognizant of this aspect of his soul. Inasmuch as "all Jews are kings," [Shabbat 67a] a couples kavanah during relations should resemble the intention that accompanied the anointing ritual.
The Mystery of Marriage, p. 351-352.
The intention that accompanied the anointing ritual was to inherit a royalty not associated with the father. In other words, a serious student of Jewish scripture and symbolism would note something significant in Rabbi Ginsburgh's statement. He compares the holy soul drawn down at rebirth on the eighth day with the "anointing" of a king. -----But the only time a king was "anointed," was when he didn't inherit his kingship from his father (Mishneh Torah, Melachim 1:12). -----"Anointing" implies the drawing down of a soul not inherited from the father such that if every Jew's rebirth is associated with "anointing" then the soul associated with the rebirth is not inherited from the father therein adding more symbolic import to the perfect match between brit milah and matrilineal transfer of identity.
A "Jewish mother" is symbolic of something real that’s real even if the symbol, "Jewish mother," isn't there. A person can be just as much a Jew without a "Jewish mother" as they can be a Jew without the mark of circumcision. Both are emblems, symbols, of a reality neither of them are in actuality. Both are judicial constructs symbolizing a real imputation. -----The law says you must be circumcised to be Jewish. But you don't have to be ritually marked for the reality of the law to be in effect. The law say you must have a Jewish mother to be Jewish. But you don't have to have a ritually, judicially recognized, Jewish mother, for the referent she represents to be real.
The same law giver who gave Abraham the commandment to
symbolically bleed the offensive flesh pretty much made matrilineal transfer of
identity a foreskin-gone conclusion, such that it could be asked, how hard
would it be for brilliant Jewish men to figure out, consciously or subconsciously,
that the spirit of circumcision requires the spirit of matrilineal transfer of
identity?
The law to ritually remove flesh from the offending organ
symbolizes the spirit of virgin birth even as virgin birth is the spirit of
matrilineal transfer of identity.
Ye must be born-again (R. Hirsch). ------And the second birth must dispose of the flesh that messes up the first birth (making a new birth necessary in the first place). So ritual circumcision and matrilineal transfer of identity are obvious requirements for being born-again in the sense being ritualized. Which is why Jews who aren't born-again don't look into the spirit of something performed mostly for ethnicity publicizing rationales. It's become, in Hirschean parlance, a mechanical habit without spirit. A sacred relic or revered mummy whose spirit they dare not rouse to action.
To cut deep enough into the circumcised flesh to reach the spirit of the ritual requires the practicing Jew to give up the two things he loves most. The ritual mark of his ritual Jewishness. And the supposed right to transfer some of his unique identity to his firstborn. . . But if he makes the final cut, so that he leaves the practice field, he becomes in reality precisely what all the ritual and practice was all about. He's no longer a practicing Jew, but a Jew through-and-through, having cut clean-through to the spirit of the founding ritual. His firstborn son won't inherit a damned thing from him (the evil inclination). . . He'll be virgin born (pure matrilineal identity) as are all who are born the second time (without the offending flesh: post-brit milah).
Ye must be born-again (R. Hirsch). ------And the second birth must dispose of the flesh that messes up the first birth (making a new birth necessary in the first place). So ritual circumcision and matrilineal transfer of identity are obvious requirements for being born-again in the sense being ritualized. Which is why Jews who aren't born-again don't look into the spirit of something performed mostly for ethnicity publicizing rationales. It's become, in Hirschean parlance, a mechanical habit without spirit. A sacred relic or revered mummy whose spirit they dare not rouse to action.
To cut deep enough into the circumcised flesh to reach the spirit of the ritual requires the practicing Jew to give up the two things he loves most. The ritual mark of his ritual Jewishness. And the supposed right to transfer some of his unique identity to his firstborn. . . But if he makes the final cut, so that he leaves the practice field, he becomes in reality precisely what all the ritual and practice was all about. He's no longer a practicing Jew, but a Jew through-and-through, having cut clean-through to the spirit of the founding ritual. His firstborn son won't inherit a damned thing from him (the evil inclination). . . He'll be virgin born (pure matrilineal identity) as are all who are born the second time (without the offending flesh: post-brit milah).
